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Abstract 
 
As a means towards revealing both the strategic and the day to day operational  
practicalities of managing a ‘responsible business’, this paper reports on research 
conducted over an extended period in the John Lewis Partnership (JLP). This is a major 
retail organization based in the UK which operates at scale (90,000 employees and 
annual sales of £11bn). It has sustained itself as an employee-owned enterprise for 
nearly a century, and it makes explicit claims to conduct itself in a ‘responsible manner’ 
which differs markedly from the notions of responsibility maintained by many 
conventional businesses.  But what do these commitments mean in practice and what 
compromises, if any, do they entail or require, and crucially how are these tensions 
managed? We find that there are many lessons that conventional organizations could 
learn from this case, and yet we also show that the process of managing in this 
responsible way is a practical accomplishment that requires considerable conceptual 
and applied skills.  
 
Introduction – The idea of a ‘responsible business’ 
 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) is a much admired - even revered - business. This is 
not only, or simply, a consequence of the important differences in the ways JLP partners 
are treated and rewarded or of the implications of this treatment for the quality of the 
services they provide customers. It is also a consequence of extensive and vigorous 
management efforts to construct the way in which the partnership is known and 
understood both within the partnership and without. These extensive and pervasive 
conceptions are not simply fabrications. They are based on reality. But they also extend 
and project a construct of reality which carries its own consequences.  
 
One of the objectives of this article to interrogate the pervasive public and internal 
perception of the JLP (especially with respect to claims about ‘responsibility’) with a 
view to separating the more complex, contradictory, even on occasion contested, 
realities of the dynamics of the partnership from the more comforting and seemingly 
unproblematic depictions found in journalistic and managerial accounts.   
 
Such an interrogation requires a focus on two key elements of the conceptions of the 
partnership: that the partnership’s employment/ownership model in itself generates 
value for customers’ and thus for profit, and that in an organization that is co-owned, 
conflict between managers and non-management partners, and the possibility that the 
executive may make decisions not favourable to the future of the business or the 
interests of partners, are inherently unlikely. Our research reveals that both these major 
claims are questionable. 
 
2 
 
JLP management place major emphasis on a simple model: the Partner-Customer-Profit 
cycle. This contends that the way partners are treated, and the co-ownership of the 
business means that partners respond with added commitment and discretionary effort 
in ways that enhances the experiences of customers (important in a service-based 
industry) and that this thus enhances profit. In the JLP version there is a further 
feedback loop to the idea that profits in turn are distributed to partners both directly and 
indirectly through the development of the business.   
 
The reality is more complex than this. First, the alleged linkages are not entirely 
automatic but require constant management intervention and management. Secondly 
while it is true that the JLP partnership model generates commitment, this is contingent 
and must be maintained by active management across a range of issues including 
decisions about the allocation of annual profits in a manner which increases the 
perception of business performance (and thus of management competence), and also 
including management efforts to ensure that management decisions are well-regarded 
and respected within the democratic structures and processes. 
 
Thirdly, while partner commitment, when assured, is capable of impacting on sales and 
sales revenues, it is seemingly less secure in delivering profitability. The JLP model is 
good for sales but less good for profits. JLP managers insist on the principle whereby 
the additional costs of the JLP model must be recoverable through the enhanced 
performance of the JLP businesses. But, after 20 years of searching for this alchemist’s 
formula there is little evidence to support this. 
 
The JLP model allows an highly unusual degree of apparent democratic influence from 
partners through representatives on senior management decision-making. However, our 
research suggests that a series of subtle management processes (including the vigorous 
management of meaning) significantly reduces the accountability of senior 
management decision-making. And while, in the short term, this makes management 
life easier, in the longer term it may also negatively impact on the quality of senior 
management strategic decisions. 
  
These considerations have taken-on an increasing importance beyond the Partnership t 
the wider business world as the idea of ‘responsible business’ has moved from 
periphery discussion about corporate social responsibility to assume a new urgency in 
contemporary business discourse.  This is most notable since the 2008/9 financial crisis.   
 
Advocates stress either the mutual gains from responsible business or the ethical 
necessity – or both. The Organisation for Responsible Business states: 
 
We believe it is essential that businesses are profitable and ensuring this must 
be the first responsibility. But profitability should not override all other 
considerations. "How" profits are made is extremely important and therein lies 
the key to other areas of responsibility that should never be overlooked. i 
 
It suggests the possibility and desirability of a mode of business behavior which goes 
beyond the conventional requirements and beyond the exercise of individual ethical 
behavior by participants in the business. It implies that in its dealings with a range of 
stakeholders the business will have (or should have) ‘behaving responsibly’ embedded 
as part of its normal ways of operating. It suggests routine behavior which extends 
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beyond mere compliance with the law. It means acting with regard to the interests of 
stakeholders beyond the owners of the firm and implies a serious intent to work towards 
socially positive outcomes. These are all attributes claimed by the founder and his 
successors in the JLP. 
 
However, the notion of a ‘responsible business’ is contentious (McWilliams and Siegel 
2001). Critics of the concept suggest that such statements express a self-serving 
propaganda designed to secure a veil of legitimacy. Conversely, they contend that it is 
wrongheaded and counter-productive to attempt to deviate from the clear pursuit of 
shareholder value.  
 
Many studies have sought to track the impact of CSR on various outcome measures 
such as financial performance, corporate reputation (Walker and Dyck 2014, Zhu, Sun 
et al. 2014) and customer loyalty (Raman, Wayne et al. 2012). Studies have also shown 
the value of reputation when confronting a crisis (Bundy and Pfarrer 2015) and the 
value of a halo effect (Chernev and Blair 2015). Other approaches indicate more of an 
interest in explaining the emergence of the phenomenon itself and/or may seek to 
explain the role of such exhortations in the context of late capitalism.  
 
Research reviews of the concept of ‘corporate social responsibility’ note the many gaps 
in understanding about these process and practice issues (Kitzmueller and Shimshack 
2012, Attig and Cleary 2015) A number of central questions are identified, these relate 
mainly to who takes responsibility for enacting and delivering a responsible business 
and how that work is balanced that with other business priorities (Baïada-Hirèche, 
Pasquero et al. 2011). This, in turn, relates to questions about actual practices of 
managers (Globerman 2011) and the organizational drivers of their actions  (Du, Swaen 
et al. 2013, Schneper, Meyskens et al. 2015). And, most central to our agenda, is the 
question of how to move beyond the ethical commitment of individual managers to a 
more systemic approach which embeds social responsibility in everyday routines and 
corporate governance (Mason and Simmons 2014).  
 
Our aim is to report on the lessons from a close study of an organization which is 
explicit in its claim to be a responsible business. Moreover, this is a business which 
defines the notion in distinctive and highly ambitious, terms and which also insists that 
its focus on socially responsible commitments has a direct and positive impact on 
performance. But, in order to put this case study into perspective, we begin with an 
overview of business-as-usual or what we term ‘normal business’. 
 
‘Normal business’  
 
From the 1970s, most notably in the USA and the UK, something changed in the way 
in which normal business was thought about and conducted. The philosophy of a 
sharper focus on shareholder value became more dominant and the share of rewards 
was skewed to highest earners. The result was that while productivity increased by 
around 80%, average wages rose on average only 4%, and corporate profits spiked to 
the highest proportion of national income for sixty years. What had changed was the 
emergence and dominance of a new ideology of the capitalist firm, which redefined the 
notion of ‘responsibility’. This new notion of business responsibility carried ideas not 
only about the firm – what it was for, how it should work, how it should be led, what 
leaders should be like and behave – but also about the necessary forms of relations 
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between workers and management and the principles which should determine these 
relations, and about the role of the state in economic life.  
 
The version of the business organization currently prevalent in the US and UK is in 
increasing trouble both in its internal operation and its external consequences. It is 
prone to periodic crisis, the decline of investment in favour of value extraction, and to 
the persistence, and even fuelling, of extreme inequality. The nature and the sources of 
the problem have been explored with increasing frequency (Appelbaum and Batt 2014; 
(Gamble 2014); (Mayer 2014); (Streeck 2014); (Wolf 2014). The short-termist outlooks 
and behaviours of shareholders have been frequently noted (Peston 2013). Corporate 
leaders feel compelled to dance to the tune of the City financiers. The time horizons of 
these fund managers and their analysts are notoriously short. The trading of stock has 
become de-coupled from sensible performance evaluation of firms. 
  
The source of the problem can be traced to ownership and to the emphasis placed on 
rewarding owners. The holding period of shareholders has declined from an average of 
eight years to about eight months (Mayer 2014). As he argues, the corporation: ‘has 
created more prosperity and misery than could ever have been imagined . . . the 
corporation is becoming a creature that threatens to consume us in its own avaricious 
ambitions’ (Mayer 2012). The corporation, especially the US/UK model, is in trouble.  
 
The emphasis on shareholder value has impacted on the ways in which senior managers 
are rewarded for achieving this dominant goal. Over the past two decades in the US the 
ratio of CEO pay to average workforce pay has changed from 21:1 to 231:1 (in banks 
500:1). Apart from wider societal consequences this also makes it harder to generate 
commitment among the workforce and also tempts CEOs into stressing profits above 
investment. 
 
In some other countries the single-minded pursuit of shareholder-value is rather less 
pronounced and the market in businesses less unrestrained. And in recent years, a 
plethora of new financial players including hedge funds, sovereign investment funds, 
and private equity have transformed the commercial landscape and accentuated the 
focus on shareholder value.  
 
As Hall and Soskice point out, there are varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
These are reflected in their celebrated distinction between liberal market economies as 
found in the UK, Canada, Australia, and the USA, and the coordinated market 
economies as found in Germany, Japan, and Sweden. As Hall and Soskice make clear, 
these varied practices are embedded in wider legal, social, and economic institutional 
contexts. In coordinated market economies, publicly listed companies are insulated 
from the effects of movements in stock prices; only a small fraction of shares is held 
and traded by dispersed shareholders; a much larger proportion is in the hands of 
families and companies who hold substantial blocks of shares for long periods.  
 
So, there is a need to imagine (or re-imagine) an alternative model of the firm which 
could possibly work even within the prevailing socio-economic institutions (or which 
could suggest ways in which these institutions should be modified). The John Lewis 
Partnership (JLP) may be a stronger basis for such an imagining than has been realized. 
While JLP is frequently invoked as a model, it is often characterized as an eccentric, 
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niche residue, and not as a source of major challenges to the ‘truths’ of the prevailing 
model.   
 
Research objectives of the case study 
 
The case organization (The John Lewis Partnership) has sustained itself over a 
prolonged period, it places employee-ownership at the core of its mission and its 
business model and it defines its responsibilities to staff, customers, suppliers and 
communities as central to its inherent purpose. In this context, our objective is to 
investigate the management practices involved in living up to these commitments when 
faced with critical business decisions relating for example to growth, financial outcome 
measures and targets, responding to economic recession, outsourcing, and 
internationalization. Thus, our research question is twofold: first, to what extent can 
this organization claim the label? second, to the extent that it might do so, how does it 
achieve this as a practical accomplishment? For this latter question, our scope and 
focus extends across strategic decision making and operational practice. 
 
An introduction to the case study organization 
 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) is a large, commercially successful retailer operating 
mainly in the UK but with some outlets in other countries. It has two main constituent 
businesses: a department store division (John Lewis) which sells a full range of assorted 
household, fashion and electrical items, and a grocery division (Waitrose) which sells 
high-quality food in a chain of approximately 100 supermarkets. The businesses all 
belong to the overall Partnership – an employee-owned enterprise whose shares are 
held in trust for employee partners.   
 
The JLP declares itself committed to a variety of ‘socially positive outcomes’. But its 
distinctiveness is revealed not only in its commitments to external, social, community 
and environmental standards and responsibilities, but more importantly in its 
fundamental commitments to ensuring positive outcomes for employees (‘partners’), 
customers and suppliers. These commitments are enshrined in the JLP’s constitution, 
structures, roles, processes, values and outcomes. The JLP is not a conventional 
business focused on orthodox outcomes which, as an afterthought, appends incorporate 
socially responsible commitments. Rather, it is inherently and fundamentally 
committed to responsibilities which differentiate it from conventional firms not only in 
how profits are distributed but in how they are generated. 
 
Social responsibility is embedded in its structures and processes. By seeking to satisfy 
a set of differentiated responsibilities to a range of stakeholders (in contrast to a unified 
focus on share-holder value) the JLP unquestionably creates a distinctive organization 
with distinctive relationships between managers and partners and between the business 
and customers. These have significant implications for the performance and reputation 
of the JLP businesses, and for the distinctive challenges for its managers and sets up a 
series of internal tensions which must be maintained and balanced (though never fully 
resolved).   
 
Furthermore, the JLP is of special interest because while conventional firms may claim 
to be committed to CSR goals as a reflection of the morality and values of the business 
(and therefore as a boost to reputation) it explicitly defines its commitment to 
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responsibilities towards staff, customers and suppliers as central to its business model, 
its behavior and performance. The JLP claims a direct causational linkage between its 
social responsibilities and its performance. 
 
While JLP is unusual it may point the way to benefits that could be achieved more 
widely by businesses which, albeit not prepared to match the generosity of the JLP’s 
founder in giving away ownership, might emulate some its other features through 
societal, legal and institutional mechanisms and prompts. The JLP is distinctive and 
interesting because it views ‘responsibility’ as central to its ultimate purpose and its 
everyday delivery of its mission. It defines its objectives not in terms of increasing 
shareholder value, but, rather remarkably in the context of today’s language codes, as 
to ensure ‘the happiness of all its members, through their worthwhile and satisfying 
employment in a successful business... because the Partnership is owned in trust for its 
members, they share the responsibilities of ownership as well as its rewards profit, 
knowledge and power.’  
 
So much for the public proclamation. We set out to peep behind the curtain in order to 
understand what was actually happening and to understand how it was made to happen.  
 
Research design and methods 
 
Our approach included what might be termed ‘business research projects’ as well as 
‘academic research projects’. We were closely involved with the organization over a 
15 year period. The first 10 years was spent working on specific strategic projects 
concerning management development, business planning, values and culture, and board 
behaviours. But the final 5 years shifted the focus to a more conventional academic 
research mode of engagement.  A central part of our academic research was to construct 
a 15 year timeline which tracked significant events such as responses to recession, the 
opportunity to expand into international markets, outsourcing of support functions, the 
introduction of partner (employee) surveys, attempts to revitalize democratic 
engagement and other significant critical incidents and shifts in strategy. We then 
mapped these events using diverse sources of information: most notably, drawing on 
the extensive business plans and related supporting documents supplemented and 
overlain with our own interviews of the principal players over the relevant time periods. 
Through this method of triangulation, we sought to understand and interpret how senior 
managers negotiated a series of key decision events. Using this method we delved into 
debates about ‘who is a member’ (dilemmas about whether to include outsourcing 
partners employed in retail outlets, warehousing and distribution centers etc) and into 
the fold of full membership; debates about whether and how to go international (would 
overseas employees be members of the partnership); debates about the merits of growth 
and at what pace and scale; debates about the fundamental purpose of the enterprise 
and associated debates about appropriate measures of performance - would these match 
conventional business measures or depart from these? 
 
As part of this academic research phase, we interviewed nearly all members of the 
senior management teams at corporate level and at the business division levels and in 
the shared services.  This group in total amounted to approximately 100 informants. 
Interviews were in the main recorded and transcribed. The resulting data set represents 
a critical reflection and interpretation of senior managers own accounts of their 
understandings and actions. In certain specific areas, we drilled-down into the 
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underlying layers to round-out our understanding of practices in retail trading and the 
operation of the supply chain.  
 
The case findings and analysis which follow are divided into two parts. The first part 
focuses on employee ownership and its related components of sharing of power, 
knowledge and rewards. The second part widens the lens to consider how the case 
organization conducts itself with a wider range of stakeholders such as customers and 
suppliers.   
 
Employee ownership and democratic voice 
 
A strong anchor in the responsible business identity of the JLP, stems from its 
ownership structure. The shares are held in trust on behalf of all employees. It is not 
quoted on the stock exchange: it raises investment capital by borrowing and by drawing 
on its own revenues. This independence is seen by senior managers as crucial: they 
continually emphasize that they can take the long view as they are not subject to 
quarterly reviews by the City. The partners have a voice in the running of the 
Partnership which includes a structure of representational democracy culminating in a 
Partnership Council and partner representatives elected to the main Board. There are 
three ‘governing authorities’ at the pinnacle of the Partnership: the Chairman, the 
Partnership Council, and the Partnership Board. The relationship between these is 
intended to be a system of checks and balances. 
The JLP has made an unusual investment in democratic structures and processes. There 
are elected worker representatives on the main Board - a feature that marks a contrast 
with most companies. There is a tiered structure of committees from branch level 
through to divisional level and then corporate level to enable the partner voice to be 
heard—and indeed, to use a classic Partnership phrase, ‘to hold management to 
account’. 
 
With ‘employee ownership’ comes the expectation that the organization will have a 
distinctive purpose and a set of objectives which differ from a conventional PLC. One 
key question deriving from this is the stance adopted towards the pursuit of profit. Will 
this be central or will it be but one objective alongside more distinctive others? The 
official position, as publicly stated, is as follows: 
 
The Partnership should make sufficient profit to sustain our commercial 
vitality and distinctive character, allow continued development and 
distribute a share of profits each year consistent with Partners’ 
reasonable expectations (The JLP Constitution) 
 
The elaborate structure of governing parties and of participatory mechanisms with 
voting, and time away from the trading floor in order to engage in scrutiny and debate, 
are all part of the system of checks and balances. There is a conscious attempt to install 
high standards of corporate governance. However, the extent to which, and the ways in 
which, partners can actually hold managers to account is questionable. 
A further distinctive feature is the package of benefits. Partners share in profits, 
distributed as an annual bonus. The average bonus over the period 2011-2016 was over 
14%, but the bonus showed steady decline over this period as the JLP experienced the 
vicissitudes of competition and of radically changing business models. Partners also 
8 
 
enjoy access to a benefits package which includes an unusual range of benefits – 
sabbaticals, leisure amenities and the like. Survey data reveal that 94 per cent of 
partners place a high value on the benefits provided; this puts the Partnership in the top 
10 per cent of UK employers according to ORC benchmarking.  
Until 2015, the JLP had a final salary, non-contributory   final salary pension scheme. 
But this has recently been changed in favour of a hybrid scheme partly based on staff 
contributions. An unusual staff-support function is to be found in the role of the 
‘registrars’. Registrars at central office and out in the branches ‘work with management 
to create a high performance culture’, whilst ensuring that this is in accord with 
‘behaviour that is consistent with our principles and values’ and to help deliver 
‘outstanding commercial results’. Part of their function is to ensure that branch 
managers and others do not become commercially focused at the expense of staff 
interests.  
The partner–customer–profit model, which is central to JLP management’s conception 
of the essential dynamic and logic which connects the JLP’s distinctive conception of 
purpose with the distinctive performance of the JLP businesses, is not only descriptive; 
it is also aspirational, ideological, and prescriptive. It simplifies reality and it asserts a 
simple mutually supportive, instrumental relationship.  
An absolute good (morality in/at work) is translated into something which is 
instrumentally good: and an end becomes a means. This subtly converts business 
success and any decision to achieve business success from an important and necessary 
precondition of partner happiness, to the source of partner happiness and thus the goal 
of the business, since the objective of the business is the happiness of partners. This 
argument not only posits a process of causation, but by doing so, also creates a moral 
responsibility among those who initiate the process, but it also defuses (rules out) any 
conflict between the various participants in the process. 
 
Profitability, managers argue, is what is necessary to meet the challenges the 
partnership faces from five directions: supporting the pension fund; investment to 
increasing the efficiency of the businesses and changing the skills and capabilities base; 
investment to fund growth through opening new stores, new distribution centres; 
investments in online retail capability and adapting the historic—‘shop-based’—model 
and the systems and processes which support it; and lowering the cost of existing 
branches. JLP businesses must meet these challenges; ‘sufficient profit is the degree of 
profitability necessary to fund the divisions’ reactions to these threats’ (Document 
source, 2013). But locating the precise desired and required level of profit remains 
contentious. And it is hard to avoid the impression that levels of profitability have both 
real and symbolic significance. They are regarded not only as means of ensuring funds 
for investment, pensions, bonus, debt interest (and maintaining credit status), but also 
as a symbolic and public indication of corporate performance—as a way of 
demonstrating internally and externally, the quality of corporate achievement and thus 
of the JLP model and of JLP management, and so of management legitimacy. 
 
In reality, JLP profitability is not at the same level as other retailers; while revenue 
growth tends to be higher than average, margin (profit) tends to be lower. This is not 
by conscious design. It is regarded as a regrettable shortfall that must be addressed 
through efficiency and other initiatives. Furthermore, the relatively low level of 
profitability does make it difficult to fund the Partnership’s various commitments, 
which is why, in 2015, the pension arrangements were altered, the bonus was reduced 
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and a bond for £3m issued to cover payments to the pension fund. But, is a low level of 
profitability a failure (as measure din conventional terms) or a success in that it reflects 
the operationalization of the Partnerships unique priorities?  
 
Co-ownership introduces tensions that have to be managed; yet management policies 
may be insufficient to achieve this. JLP managers recognize that a balance must be 
struck between the polarities of performance and partnership and their attempts to ‘find 
a balance’ must be explored and assessed. The JLP difference, managers insist, 
generates—or should generate—competitive advantage. One interviewee commented 
as follows: 
 
If you’re a believer in partnership then your starting point has to 
be….that the partnership way of doing business gives you a competitive 
advantage. It gives you a competitive advantage which is sustainable, 
difficult to copy, difficult to replicate, defensible and a true point of 
distinction. (Director, 2012) 
But this potential must be realized by management. 
In reality managers recognize that the JLP model can be both an advantage and a 
disadvantage: 
 
 I think, at worst, sometimes the partnership model is used as an excuse to not 
do those difficult things which would generate that additional return, it should 
give us the most fantastic advantage, but we struggle to turn that into economic 
advantage (Director, 2014). 
 
JLP managers place much emphasis on the importance of trust.  Trust is the expected 
response to the successful demonstration that responsibilities are real and are honoured. 
Managers stress that customers trust the JLP and that is crucial for the success of the 
business. Customer trust is based on their trust in JLP partners and their confidence that 
the JLP employment model and values and ownership structure do not prioritise profit 
above partner or supplier welfare.  In other words the JLP’s commitment to multiple 
responsibilities is important in affecting perceptions of the public and the performance 
of the business and therefore must be maintained. 
 
Senior JLP management stress the morality of their actions. This includes efficiency 
which, in JLP must be defined not simply as necessary (as in conventional businesses) 
but also as morally right: one component of this is to insist that in a co-owned business 
committed to partner happiness, partners are morally responsible for performance: 
‘Because the Partnership is owned in trust for members, they share the responsibilities 
of ownership as well as its rewards—profit, knowledge and power’. JLP has three 
‘Partner commitments’. And number one is: ‘Take responsibility for our business 
success—we take responsibility for delivering the right experience for all of our 
customers, generating profits for us all to share’ (Annual Report, 2013: 18). So co-
ownership is translated into co-responsibility. 
 
But stressing morality also carries risks. One of these is that the functionality of conflict 
as a potential source of alternative ways of seeing is downplayed and conflict is defined 
negatively. Dissent may be de-legitimized and viewed as disloyalty. A moralized 
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management context may make disagreement and challenge more difficult and more 
emotional—challenge is more likely to be discouraged and to be defined as selfishness 
or betrayal. So a possible, inadvertent and unanticipated consequence of the attempt to 
define partners’ involvement and responsibilities in moral terms might be to reduce and 
sideline important potential sources of alternative perspectives. 
 
In conventional businesses, the values that characterize work and employment are the 
values of the market: exchange transactions, market calculations of price and value, the 
‘morality’ and authority of profit, self-interest. And these values are so widespread and 
so represented and honoured by commentators, government, and so embedded in the 
language of organizations and the measurements of performance and in the entire fabric 
of modern society, as to require no special extra work by management. Their 
management of meaning is done for them by external agencies. The market rules, in 
practice and morally. It is a ‘fact of life’. 
 
In JLP this is not the case because there is an alternative language which emphasizes 
radically alternative priorities: for example, ‘partner happiness’. This creates a potential 
dilemma: and to solve this managers have to ensure that their actions are seen as 
consistent with prevailing systems of JLP morality. So, not only must managers 
represent what they do in terms of historic values, but also interpret or reinterpret these 
values for modern times. It is the moral foundations of the JLP that give the Partnership 
its competitive edge—and which adds to the appeal to customers. But this difference 
also supplies the framework within which managers have to act and represent their 
actions. 
 
One major theme of the JLP dominant narrative is that JLP is a better way of doing 
business—and that morally better means commercially better. At best, as managers 
know only too well, this is only partly true. But the consequence of this assertion is to 
legitimate and support management’s insistence that to receive the benefits of the JLP 
model, to experience the better experience of being a partner (which are real), is to 
accept a moral responsibility to produce the extra business benefits or to accept the 
legitimacy of management actions aimed at improving the efficiencies of the 
business—efficiencies which are in a sense the rightful dues of the businesses. Hence, 
in effect, JLP managers have subtly adapted the JLP model to make it create a form of 
contract between partner and Partnership that thus legitimizes management’s right to 
enforce this contract. Morality thus becomes contractual: a subtle and interesting 
transition from the language of morals to the language of the market. 
 
Another application of the contractualization of the JLP legacy is the widespread 
management message that the extra cost of the JLP model, and the impact of the model 
on partners (the ‘better’ way to do business) must ultimately be recoverable through the 
extra profit achieved by virtue of the value partners generate through their reactions to 
being treated ‘better’. This reinforces the message that management is entitled to extra 
performance from partners by virtue of the partners’ exposure to the JLP model, and 
that partners have a ‘responsibility’ to produce this. And so again the language of 
exchange and contract is laid on top of the language of morality—through the pivotal 
and ambiguous word: ‘better’. Partners, in their work, have a responsibility to repay the 
cost of the JLP model with all its benefits. This is an interesting re-definition (from 
rights to responsibilities) of the implications of ownership.  
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But JLP managers’ reliance on the narrative of consensus and harmony, may make the 
expression of challenge or the argument that consensus has limits and that real 
differences also exist alongside cooperation and consensus, harder to express by 
partners and harder to hear or accept for JLP managers. The stress on consensus may 
become so dominant that JLP managers themselves believe it: so any statement that 
deviates from prevailing orthodoxy (the dominant regime of truth: consensus) is seen 
as indicative of management failure (to communicate, to persuade) or partner 
disengagement or lack of commitment. So the actual issue being raised, or the 
alternatives being proposed, are seen as symptoms, not as genuine proposals: as 
indications of dysfunction and management failure. 
 
JLP managers have been successful in creating and disseminating a narrative about the 
JLP, its nature, and consequences. This narrative insists on the legitimacy and 
consistency of management actions and partner ‘responsibilities’ in terms of the 
Partnership’s historic moral framework and expectations. Management has also been 
successful in reinterpreting core components in this moral context in more modern, 
reciprocal, contractual terms. The narrative is not mere rhetorical window-dressing: it 
is based on reality and real difference—it reflects the history and distinctiveness of the 
JLP. But it also defines and creates reality—smoothing corners, simplifying, stressing 
some possibilities while skating over others. 
 
Wider stakeholder responsibilities 
 
The JLP is highly unusual in that it makes explicit and public insistence that it has 
responsibilities to its customers and suppliers as well as its employees (partners).   
Furthermore, its structures, processes and outcomes are organized to make these claims 
a reality.   
 
But how are they translated into business decisions?  And what, if anything, can 
conventional businesses learn from the JLP? JLP managers insist not only that their 
responsibilities to partners and to customers and to necessary levels of business 
performance (to ensure continuing success) are compatible, but also that they are 
necessary for business success. JLP managers claim that the JLP model generates 
consequences which are attractive to customers and so add to the businesses’ 
performance, thus implying a minimal role for management. But, in reality, 
management has a major role to play, if anything more, not less complex than in 
conventional businesses. Managers have to deal with the implications and the 
constraints of the JLP model. This has a number of elements including, for example, 
principles and values; and a series of historic practices, institutions, roles, and 
relationships. All policies and decisions must be, or must be presented as being, 
consistent with these historic constraints. 
 
Over the past twenty-five years, senior managers have developed and implemented a 
range of business strategies and innovations but have struggled fully to ‘release the 
potential’ of the Partnership, to balance the costs of the Partnership difference by 
improved profitability, to realize the benefits that the JLP’s distinctive and better way 
of doing business must—in their view—generate. 
 
Management action to build capacity in JLP must address two major consequences of 
the JLP model: that it is a potential resource, and also potentially an obstacle which 
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must be overcome. JLP management insists on the importance and legitimacy of the 
vigorous pursuit of profit. The JLP solution is to insist that profit is the same as, and 
indeed necessary for, partner happiness, thus eliminating the possibility of conflict 
between the search for profit and partner happiness.  
 
Another benefit is that the search for profit is legitimized and placed beyond dispute. 
As one senior informant stated: 
 
When Charlie Mayfield became chairman he expressed the Partnership’s 
strategy in these three terms:  Partners, Customer Service and Profit. I think 
what he’s now trying to say is, he doesn’t want people to think about them as 
separate. They are completely interlinked.  
(Group manager, 2103)  
 
This cycle, widely and authoritatively emphasized within the Partnership, manages to 
combine the JLP difference with business efficiency by claiming that the JLP difference 
is a source of profitability; that being morally better (the JLP difference) is better for 
performance (the principles of twenty-first century retail). But the cycle is important 
within the JLP not only because it defines—as it claims—the source of JLP’s 
competitive advantage (which is more complex and uncertain than the cycle admits) 
but because by supporting management and its narrative of the JLP, in effect it resolves 
another dilemma: it defines away potential conflicts between competing logics within 
the JLP. What is good for profit is good for partners and what is good for customers 
(efficiency) is good for partners and profit. Responsible business is thus good business 
in both senses. 
 
Sales performance relative to conventional competitors adds to the allure of the model. 
But the record on profitability might diminish the attraction for those parties seeking 
maximization of return. The reduced impact on profitability might reduce the attraction 
of the model, and JLP managers struggle ceaselessly to translate the consequences of 
the JLP model for partner engagement into JLP profitability. But the JLP model adds 
to JLP costs, constrains the range of options available to management, excluding or at 
least severely limiting the ability of JLP managers to degrade employment terms, to 
outsource, increase the intensification of labour and so increase profitability by 
reducing labour costs. Morally ‘better’ may add to business benefit but in a sense it 
clearly also constrains management behaviour—and rightly so: that’s the point. 
 
Is the model replicable? 
 
In the UK, politicians and many commentators have advocated the model as one which 
public sector organizations could emulate (although it is not certain that such 
recommendations represent an enthusiasm to recreate all components of the model). 
And certainly lots of managers in conventional businesses would love to be able to re-
create the partner engagement and customer confidence/trust enjoyed by the JLP 
businesses. But it is unlikely that they would be prepared to pay the price associated 
with the model: the restrictions on management rewards and authority, and especially 
the ownership arrangements. 
 
One reason for the paradox that while the JLP model and its businesses are widely 
admired, and the links between the model and the performance of the business generally 
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recognized and valued (especially by customers), managers and decision-makers in 
conventional firms may be less enthusiastic about the model even if they accept the 
thesis (possibly especially if they accept the thesis) that the model creates business 
benefit. For what is obvious about the JLP model is that it affords fewer possibilities 
for managers to enrich themselves - partly because of the principles and constraints of 
the JLP model but also because managers’ enrichment in conventional businesses is 
through bonus systems and share option arrangements tied to the achievement of 
business results and increases in shareholder value, which are denied JLP managers 
because of its ownership structure. 
 
Within the Partnership, managers differed on this. Some argued that it was possible to 
cherry-pick components of the model and to achieve a high proportion of the benefits 
in terms of employee and customer attitudes without the JLP ownership model, or with 
a more acceptable version of the ownership arrangements: for example profit-sharing. 
These were the senior managers who defined the model as a set of techniques that they 
could, having worked with them, take with them and apply elsewhere. But even these 
managers accepted that applying the model elsewhere would put serious and, for many, 
difficult demands on managers. 
 
In practice, there are occasional examples of business owners setting up JLP-type 
arrangements but, unlike Spedan Lewis, without ceding total share ownership. 
 
Management’s good intentions are worth nothing if the business can be taken over by 
another business with a radically different management philosophy. The senior 
management of Cadbury was genuinely committed to the Quaker management 
principles of the business. But they were also legally required to protect the best interest 
of the shareholders when faced in 2009 with an increased bid from Kraft: as the 
Chairman commented, ‘fiduciary duty had to overcome emotional instinct’. Despite 
promises made to protect the workforce and facilities, these promises were rescinded 
within a few weeks of the take-over and one of the plants was closed and its work off-
shored to a cheaper location. 
 
Unlike some other retailers, JLP partners are not working to support enormous debt 
liabilities incurred by private equity owners, are not working to generate a surplus for 
the owners who may be more interested in the money that can be extracted from the 
business than its long-term health and survival. As one director observed: 
 
You would need an endowment in a trust to defend the model. At the end of the 
day this is a capitalist world and financial forces will take over, because no 
one’s going to protect it. It has to be underwritten, and if this business hadn’t 
been underwritten it would’ve gone the way of the building societies. The 
partners would’ve found a way of taking £15,000 each and not worrying about 
anything else. That really would have happened, I think. It’s a bit like capital 
punishment; people will vote for it unless you put in checks. I think you have to 
underwrite. (Waitrose director, 2014) 
 
The shared ownership basis of the JLP is not the only factor generating the 
trustworthiness of the business and its managers: the culture, constitution and 
principles, and institutions are also very important. These elements identify and lay an 
emphasis on the values that characterize relations within the JLP and between JLP and 
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the customers and suppliers. Unlike in conventional firms, the knowledge in JLP that 
the business is protected from the risk of management strategies devised by managers 
oriented towards shareholder value is a crucial underpinning of employee and customer 
confidence. 
 
This psychological and moral implication of JLP’s ownership is crucial. It is hugely 
important as a source of the ‘discretionary effort’ of which managers are so conscious 
and so proud. And it is a foundation on which to build the ubiquitous JLP narrative of 
difference, trust, and decency. One manager argued that one limit to the take-up of the 
model elsewhere is that top managers in general would not be satisfied with the deal. 
Furthermore, he made the important point that the replicability of JLP was limited by 
the complexities of managing within this kind of model.  
 
In any assessment of the possibility of replication of the JLP model it is necessary to 
distinguish between the image and the reality of the JLP: how it works and how 
management operates to make it work. This reality is far more complex, subtle, and 
complicated and, to a degree, contradictory than the comments and assessments of 
many advocates might suggest. Management action, carefully crafted to comply with 
the declared values and principles is required to accentuate the positives and neutralize 
the negatives. In these endeavours, recent and current management have been very 
successful. Management must balance commercial priorities and requirements and 
partners’ interests, and achieving this balance is a constant challenge. So, replicating 
the JLP—if it is possible—is going to be a complex business and require a great deal 
more management skill and understanding than some advocates recognize. 
 
Many competitors envy JLP the reputation it has achieved, its appeal to customers, the 
commitment of the partners. They would like to emulate these. But they would probably 
prefer to do this without emulating the JLP’s shared ownership. Thus, if they are 
interested in emulating the JLP, it is probably to find techniques which can assist them 
to achieve conventional objectives. This will probably be as ineffective as it is ironic: 
for the whole point of the JLP and the source of its success is that it is not simply and 
solely committed to one set of stakeholders.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Employee ownership and the employee (partner) focus are fundamental to JLP’s 
socially responsible approach and to the performance of the business. In the JLP, 
unusually, social responsibility – as distinctively defined – is not simply a matter of 
how profits are distributed, but also of how profits are generated. Furthermore, in the 
JLP, social responsibility (i.e. commitments to staff, customers and suppliers) is not 
simply a matter of executive decision and strategy but is also pervasively 
institutionalized.   Employee ownership – although fundamental in many respects 
(supplying the basis for patient shareholders and protection from predatory, asset-
stripping takeovers) would in itself not be enough to guarantee and maintain a socially-
responsible business. Employee owners could be equally prone to self-interested 
actions as conventional shareholders (apart from a stronger attachment to a sustainable 
organization). The multiple, socially responsible dimensions of the JLP model (with 
regard to customer and suppliers and society) stem from the legacy of the Founder’s 
wider business philosophy and practical ethics, which were institutionalized through a 
set of mechanisms and policies which have endured. These include: a commitment to 
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the sharing of power, knowledge and rewards; a set of governing authorities which are 
designed to provide checks and balances; a written constitution which enshrines the 
values and the rights and responsibilities; a set of democratic institutions which 
encourage employee participation and a principle of holding management to account 
even if this may be attenuated in practice; a culture embedded enough to ensure that 
key appointments are, overall, mindful of the ongoing commitment to the set of values.   
 
The John Lewis Partnership is not a consultancy package, or a collection of 
management, communication, reward, and participation techniques focusing on sharing 
profit, knowledge, and power. It is much more than this: it is fundamentally a set of 
serious, inter-locked and mutually supportive commitments and responsibilities 
towards its key stakeholders, responsibilities and commitments which are underpinned 
by the ownership structure and maintained by a set of supportive structure, processes 
and values. While a fascinating organization in its right (and a source of pleasure and 
trust for customers and admirers) it is potentially of greater and far-reaching importance 
because by showing that genuinely honouring and protecting the interests of partners 
and suppliers actually improves customers’ trust and thus revenue, it shows that morally 
better can also be business better. And by demonstrating that limiting the capacity of 
speculator, asset-stripping corporate purchasers supports the long term growth and 
security of the business, the JLP shows the benefits that accrue from the various societal   
institutional mechanisms deployed around the world to curtail corporate speculators 
and encourage patient capitalism. 
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